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Abstract
This paper explores the historical roots and contemporary manifestations of Belize and
Panamá’s exclusion from the Central American “imagined community”—that is, the
definition of which countries comprise “Central America.” While there are seven countries
that geographically exist in the region, not all seven are always classified as belonging to
Central America due to factors such as differences in histories, racial distribution, and cultural
expressions, among others. The aim of this article is to more fully explore and analyze the
many reasons behind these exclusions and to propose a reconsideration of the narrative,
thereby creating the possibility of an expanded and more inclusive “Central America.”
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Introduction: Who is “Central America”?

Figure 1 Map of Central America

Central America is a region with a difficult and tumultuous history, filled with shifting
alliances and constant intra-regional warfare. It has long struggled to create a lasting, coherent
identity for itself, in the way that many other regions throughout the world, such as Western
Europe or the Middle East, have purportedly achieved. Despite sharing many commonalities
with each other – including colonial histories and cultural traits – Central America does
not seem to have one single definition of who it is. Since the colonial era, from the 16th
century and on, the region has been unsure of which nations in the isthmus are included
in “Central America.” Indeed, there are even debates over whether México ought to be
considered a Central American state. At the center of this debate are Belize and Panamá, two
Central American republics that have long been outliers in the region’s history. Meanwhile,
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, who will be referred to
throughout the paper as “the Core Five,” have a profound history of interconnectedness and
cultural overlap that has unified them in ways that Belize and Panamá have never experienced.
This paper explores the historical and contemporary exclusion of Belize and Panamá
from the Central American “imagined community”—that is, the definition of “Central
America,” accepted by any number of domestic and international parties — with the aim to
more fully comprehend the many reasons behind this exclusion and to create a framework
for addressing issues raised by the current definition. This paper will not argue in favor of
creating a formal, internationally recognized regional organization, such as the European
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Union. Rather, it aims to promote a re-visioning of whom the Central American imagined
community is with the purposeful inclusion of Belize and Panamá, more in the vein of the
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as an approach for the strengthening of the
overall regional identity.

Divergent Histories: Overview of Regional History

Figure 2 Outline of major colonial events 1500s - 1800s

In A Brief History of Central America (1989), Costa Rican scholar Hector Perez-Brignoli
covers the main events of the region’s formation, beginning with 16th century colonial history
and spanning the late 1900s. What is fascinating about Perez-Brignoli’s version of Central
America’s regional history is that he, quite purposefully, does not include Belize and Panamá:

80

In 1985 Belize and Panam[á] became part of the region under the perspective we [the
author and his readers] will adopt. Their membership arises barely a decade ago,
however. Up until the Torrijos regime (1968-1981), Panam[á] as an independent state
hardly participated in Central American politics. The same could be said of Belize
[…] For these reasons we have left aside any consideration of both countries’ internal
development. (p. xii)
The author notes that he will mention Belizean and Panamanian influence where relevant
to the region’s overall story, but that, ultimately, they do not fit into his definition. PerezBrignoli’s selectivity with Belize and Panamá’s histories demonstrates plainly how peoples’
perspectives affect their chosen definitions of “Central America,” and how any combination of
histories, political views, and cultural beliefs culminates in the understanding an individual
might have of what constitutes Central America.
The contemporary exclusion of Belize and Panamá from the Central American imagined
community arguably has deep historical roots that date back to the colonial era, when
European conquistadores were carving out swaths of North and South American land and
settling there. The Spanish colonized Central American soil, defining what would become the
contemporary Core Five and Panamá during the 16th and 17th centuries. The only exception
was Belize: an attempt was made by the Spanish to colonize this territory like the rest of the
region, and though they experienced some degree of success, the indigenous Maya population
resisted control and eventually drove the Spanish out in the mid-1500s. It was not until the
1650s that Belize saw another attempt at colonization, this time by the British, who settled
the territory and officially claimed it as a colony of the Empire in 1862, dubbing it British
Honduras. Panamá shares similar colonial roots with the Core Five, having been settled by
Spanish explorers in 1510. However, the Panamanian republic’s history diverges from theirs
in the 18th century, when the Viceroyalty of New Andalucia (later New Granada, then Gran
Colombia) was established, including Panamá as well as present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela. At this time, the Core Five were members of the Kingdom of Guatemala, which
was formed in 1609 under the Spanish Empire. The establishment of these colonial boundaries
would serve as future lines of separation when considering nation-to-nation sympathies and
alliances.
Bearing these differing origins in mind, the defining point for Central America as a
completely unified region—or, as a region that could be potentially unified—was the collective
secession in 1821. In 1821, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and
Panamá all declared their separation from Spain; but here, again, there is a divergence from
the Core Five. In 1823, these five states joined together to create the Federal Republic of Central
American States. William F. Slade (1917) delves into the formation of the Federal Republic
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of Central American States, providing an analyzed overview of the timeline of events that
culminated in the creation of the Federation in 1823. In his analysis of the Federation, Slade
(1917) seems to posit the idea that the Central American union (consisting of the Core Five
states) was doomed to fail before it was even formed and supports this claim by laying out a
story of disunity that characterized the region. According to him, the main issue lay in each
state’s desire to be the one in charge: “No republic seemed altogether willing to enter into a
federation unless it could be the dominant force” (p. 104). The Federation of Central American
States lasted for sixteen strenuous years before disbanding in 1839. Panamá took a different
route by not joining the Federation when it seceded, instead opting to become a part of the
confederacy of Gran Colombia (formerly New Andalucia or New Granada) with Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú, and Bolivia. The confederacy dissolved in 1830, and Panamá was
absorbed into Colombia, where it stayed until 1903. The Federation was the first attempt at
regional unification, but not the last by far. What is relevant to note from this first instance
of unification is how Belize and Panamá were not a part of the Federation, clearly born from
distinctive colonial legacies—but more importantly, how this set a trend for how the region
would function as a unit in the future. It is from these historical roots that “Central America”
was created, a definition that has persisted into the modern day understanding of the region.

Regionalism & the Imagining of “Central America”
Benedict Anderson defines an imagined community as a “political community, both
inherently limited and sovereign,” describing it as “imagined” because “the members of even
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). It
is a community that ignores physical realities and imagines itself as united, brought together
by collective experience, identity, or custom (Fawcett, 2004, p. 432). But the central question
to consider when discussing imagined communities is, “Who is doing the imagining?” That
is, through whose perception is the community being perpetuated and reinforced? Without
agents of imagination, there is no imagined community. If there is any lesson to be learned
from the turbulent history of Central America, it is that a shared or similar history does not
an imagined community make. So, who, then, is doing the imagining that creates the popular
idea of contemporary “Central America,” particularly the version that excludes Belize and
Panamá? The foremost answer to this is Central Americans themselves. An example of this
domestic imagining is found in the case of Belize’s venture for independence, where the
country appealed to the UN for its independence from Great Britain. Of the six other Central
American states, only one supported Belize’s independence: Panamá. Among the other states,
there is a definite manifestation of the popular imagined community, and it pointedly did
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not include Belize. Eventually, the rest of the region did back Belize’s appeal, and this later
acceptance into the fold through certain efforts demonstrates that there is flexibility in how the
Central American community can be defined (see “Historical Tension” section). An imagined
community is an entity that is created from a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1983,
p. 15-16), meaning a relationship where all members are recognized and appreciated equally, a
comradeship that was displayed through Panamá’s public support of Belize.
While an imagined community relies more upon shared characteristics and less on
physical realities, geography can still play a vital role in solidifying a sense of community.
Peoples inhabiting a shared area or region together are more likely to form similar
characteristics to base a community around. “Regionalism” is the idea that distinct sovereign
states in a region can form a united identity and is a key point when illustrating the current
“Central America” and how it may be improved in the sense of seeking a more coherent,
complete, and supportive interstate community. Regionalism can be understood in many
ways, the most popular including geographical realities (states physically sharing a border),
zones where people share similar behavioral patterns, and in the context of an imagined
community, “states or peoples held together by a common experience and identity, custom
and practice” (Fawcett, 2004, p. 432).
Somewhat in contrast to Fawcett’s definition, which still centers culture and customs,
Fredrik Söderbaum (2013) claims that contemporary regionalism has emerged in response to
globalization, posing the question, ‘For whom and for what purpose are regional activities
carried out?’ (p. 17), as the answers to those questions form the basis for regional unity.
Söderbaum’s research focuses on Southern Africa, a regional body that has been constructed
around “corporations and capital interests in the formal economy” (p. 13); Southern Africa’s
regional identity is contingent on economic unity as well as geographical circumstance. Central
America is also often seen primarily through a geopolitical lens because of its strategic location
and its usefulness for outsourcing cheap manufacturing and labor (Chaverri, 1985). This is
particularly true of the United States, whose influence has been pivotal in shaping the region
into how it is perceived today. It can be argued that, just as leftovers from the colonial era have
crafted the Central American identity, US American involvement has considerably defined
who Central America is, both domestically and internationally. This can even be seen dating
back to the 1800s attempt at unification: “The formation of a powerful independent Central
American Federation was not palatable to the Cabinet at Washington, for the principal reason,
that the monopoly of the Isthmus would no longer be in the hands of the Americans, but be
open to the world” (Slade, p. 130). The Federation did not fit the United States’ agenda, and it,
therefore, found it necessary to redefine the Central American community so that it fell within
the parameters of a geopolitically advantageous region. This is exactly similar to how the US
intervened in 1903 to ensure Panamá’s independence so that they might stake a claim to the
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Canal. This shows a tenacious history of the US asserting its influence over Central America
to craft the imagined community into a profitable body by ensuring the Central American
republics were, and are, so reliant on US econopolitics that they have no choice but to conform
to that perception. Though regionalism is generally thought of in terms of economic and
political factors that tie independent states together, framing regionalism through an imagined
community lens is no less legitimate and can be just as powerful an adhesive as economic
interdependence, if not more so.
One of the main issues that arises when establishing an imagined community, or even
a region, is legitimization, as this is typically achieved through international recognition.
Although those involved in the community themselves will always have the most important
perspective on who is included in that formation, much of the imagining is done through
foreign agents. More often than not, this influence has a negative impact on how a community
is created, especially in Central America, who has been the victim of Global Northern influence
through the entirety of its recorded history. The Northern Triangle, for example, consists of
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and has been politically imagined due to their shared
experience with civil war, violence, and drug trafficking—certainly, this is not a community
that has chosen itself; rather, it has been defined by the international community. Why, then,
can’t the international community be persuaded to reimagine the current conception of Central
America to include Belize and Panamá?

Motivators for Exclusion
Central America has a long legacy of attempted unification as a region, through several
bids at merging a myriad of different country combinations under a varied list of leaders.
There were eight efforts between 1842 and 1862 alone, often with a new mix of the Core
Five nations (Slade, 1917, p. 102). However, as Perez-Brignoli phrases it, all attempts at a
unified region ended in essentially the same manner: “wars, destruction, and death” (p. 92).
Understanding that the Core Five have struggled to find common ground, regardless of all
their shared history, is crucial to framing the question of Belize and Panamá.

I. Colonial Legacy
It is particularly easy to separate Belize from Central America based on the effects of
its divergent colonial history. Having been colonized by the British, Belize is the only republic
whose official language is English rather than Spanish. For many, that linguistic characteristic
alone is enough to draw a distinct line around the imagined community, with Belizeans on
the outside. This trait may also be applied to Panamá, who also maintains a high level of
English proficiency due to its close relations with the United States and other English-speaking
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countries that have Canal-related business interests. Although Spanish remains Panamá’s
official language, such a prevalence of English creates a similar disconnect to that experienced
by Belize. In this same vein, Belize and Panamá’s relationships with their respective colonizer
states (in this context, meaning the United States for Panamá, rather than Spain) remain
strong. Although the Core Five may have retained tangential relations with Spain, it in no way
compares to the close ties Belize has with Britain and Panamá with the United States.
Panamá’s relationship may be almost entirely based on economic relevance but
dismissing it as merely that ignores the actual depth of their shared Central American history.
When Panamá separated from Colombia in 1903 and declared independence, it was with the
support of the United States fleet (Perez-Brignoli, p. 123). Since that event, the US has been
directly involved in shaping Panamá into the Canal-focused business haven that, for better or
worse, it is today. Despite later pushes to gain autonomy from the US, the US still remains a
powerful influence in Panamá, resulting in intriguing Panamanian sympathies toward the US
and its citizens, at least compared to the rest of the region (Theodossopoulos, 2010). Belize’s
relationship with the UK is equally as significant. Belize gained independence from Britain in
1981, nearly 200 years later than the rest of the region. Despite their national independence,
they remain part of the English Commonwealth realm, resulting in continued British interest
and involvement. This is especially evidenced by British willingness to deploy troops to
defend Belizean territory from outside threats, namely from Guatemala, an action that has
been taken numerous times throughout Belize’s pre- and post-independence history (Bolland,
1988).

II. Historical Tension
The Guatemala-Belize tension is a significant factor for exclusion. Guatemala has
an extensive history of claiming Belize as its own territory, dating back 150 years, when
Guatemala claimed Belize as its twenty-third department. This claim was purportedly resolved
with a treaty in 1859 between Guatemala and Britain, but Guatemala contested the treaty in
the latter part of the 1800s, and the dispute has been ongoing since. When Belize first made its
push toward independence in 1975, every single Central American nation voted “no” during
the UN resolution to grant Belize’s nationhood, likely in support of Guatemala’s claims to
the territory. Notably, the first Central American country to reach out to Belize after the vote
was Panamá: in 1976, the two countries’ leaders met at a summit meeting, at the end of which
Panamá threw its support behind Belize. During the next UN vote in 1980, Belize won the
rest of Central America’s votes – aside from Guatemala, who continued to refuse to recognize
its independence in 1981 (Young and Young, 1988). Although Belize won support from the
republics by 1980, their initial reaction to support Guatemala is significant—it demonstrates
how, to them, the Central American imagined community did not, and would not, include
Belize.
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III. Racial Prejudice

Figure 3 Distribution of the Black population in Central America (Source: CIA, 2018)

The distribution of Black people throughout Central America offers another reason
behind who can be included in “Central America.” Racism and colorism are extremely
pervasive throughout Central America, just like any other part of the world, and particularly
those with fierce colonial histories that demanded colonized land be reshaped into sanctums
for whiteness. The legacy of fierce racism, in its quest to establish a safe place for white
Europeans and their descendants, is not something easily grown out of: “Racial prejudice
never ceased to be a fundamental mechanism in the forging of the Patria Criolla (Creole Nation)
[in Central America]. […] The exclusion of Indians and [B]lacks was an inviable social norm[.]
This exclusion found its echo well into the twentieth century in many segregation practices,
both tacit and open, and in outright prohibitions” (Perez-Brignoli, p. 9). In other words, the
Creole Nation developed from a social hierarchy based on the European conception of race,
which prioritized whiteness.
This hierarchy is still in place and impacts contemporary Central American social
structure and regional relationships, presenting a new perspective for understanding the
exclusion of Belize and Panamá from the Central American community. Belize and Panamá
have the highest Black/Afro-descendant populations in Central America, at 32% and 16%

86

respectively. The next highest percentage resides in Nicaragua, at 9%. From there, the numbers
dwindle significantly until Guatemala’s 0.5% and El Salvador’s mere 0.1% (See Figure 2).
Considering the influence of European notions of racial superiority, the comparatively
significant presence of Black populations in Belize and Panamá may correlate to their exclusion
from the Central American community. The racial hierarchy that was implemented in each
republic can be expanded to fit a regional lens, placing Belize and Panamá at the bottom. The
topic of slavery is hardly even spoken of in Salvadoran schools, undoubtedly due to the lack
of Black history in their country (Euraque and García, 2013, p. 35). Exposure to Blackness in
society is critical to shaping how Black people are perceived and treated.
The Garífuna are an Afro-indigenous group descended from the Carib people of
the Caribbean and Africans who escaped slavery. The Garifuna arrived in Belize by way
of Honduras from as early as 1802 and have since lived in Belize along the Caribbean
coast, making up about 6% of the country’s total population. The Garifuna are principally
discriminated against for their race and for their culture, even within their home countries,
let alone in other republics in the region. This discrimination is created out of colonial legacy,
putting light-skinned/white people at the top of the social hierarchy, and dark-skinned/Black
people at the bottom (Bonner, 1999). Although both Afro-descendant Creoles and the Afroindigenous Garífuna are Black, because of Creoles’ of European descent, they are higher on
the social hierarchy than the Garífuna, who are much closer to their African roots. Returning
to the Belize-Guatemala conflict, one can see the role racism plays through an explicit example
against the Garífuna. In 1971, a Guatemalan playwright wrote a production called Goodbye,
Belize that was based on the long-standing border dispute between Guatemala and Belize. The
play features actors in Blackface—a racist tradition in theatre originating in the 19th century,
where non-Black actors darkly color their skin in order to caricaturize Black people—dressed
in traditional Garífuna clothes and dancing to Garífuna music. The most recent performance
of this play was in 2018, presented in light of Guatemala’s newest bid at claiming Belize’s
territory. This pointed ridicule of an Afro-indigenous group that only makes up a small portion
of Belize’s Black population makes it obvious that Guatemala perceives Belize as a Black
country and considers that a shameful trait.
Slade asserts that perhaps the “seeds of separation” and disunion were sown during
the colonial era (p. 79), meaning that it is impossible to disconnect Central America’s struggle
for unity from its difficult history as colonized land, almost putting the blame entirely on the
Europeans. Though this argument does have some credence, stressing that these attitudes
grew from the circumstances the countries were placed in through colonization, it would be
irresponsible to let current discriminatory actions and ideals go unchallenged simply because
of their roots.
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IV. A Case for Self-Exclusion
Both domestic (Central America) and international agents (the US and UK, among
other Global Northern entities) have had a hand in creating any number of imaginations of
the Central American community. However, not all of the exclusion can be wholly attributed
to the actions (or inactions) of the Core Five nor the Global North: there is also something
to be said about self-exclusion on the part of Belize and Panamá from the Central American
imagined community.
Panamá’s self-exclusion is heavily related to the aforementioned consequence of US
intervention. With an annual GDP per capita of $15,575, Panamá is the wealthiest republic in
the isthmus (International Monetary Fund, 2018a) – it is followed by Costa Rica at $12,094 per
capita (2018b), then the gap widens significantly, with the third highest GDP being Belize’s
$4,862 (2018c). Panamá has, perhaps, the most positive international perception, or at least
the most neutral, when compared to its regional counterparts. Rather than violence being its
identifier, Panamá is more quickly associated with economic prosperity. It may be asserted
that, from this economic strength, a sort of egoism has developed within the country, a selfimportance that causes Panamá to disparage the rest of the region. Such close connection with
major Global Northern powers like the United States and England could possibly lead to a
dismissal of any need for those in Central America, who do not possess much econopolitical
pull within the international context.
Belize’s possible self-exclusion has a much different origin from that of Panamá: Belize’s
is a prejudice that has been referred to as “Hispanophobia,” discrimination against Spanishspeakers. This is most likely born out of the history of the border dispute with Guatemala.
Spanish-speaking Central Americans often receive pitiable treatment in Belize, forced into
poor-paying jobs, very obviously marginalized within Belizean society: “Many Belizeans,
particularly the Creoles of Belize City, refer to these people as “aliens” or “Spanish” and view
them as something of a scapegoat for the nation’s problems” (Bolland, 1988, p. 208). There
is a fear of “Spanish takeover” in the country (Bolland, 1988, p. 215), which, again, has likely
grown due to the Guatemalan claims. It is, therefore, in a sense, understandable that Belize
may have some reservations of being involved in a community that has very openly displayed
its willingness to exclude it.
While these examples of self-exclusion are, arguably, manifested from the circumstances
that the Core Five or the Global North placed them in, it remains sensible to highlight them.
By doing so, more avenues may be identified that Belize and Panamá could take in order to
be included within the community. There are many definitions of Central Americas within
Central America, each formed from their own characteristic and situational histories, and each
perpetuated through a different imagining. Some of these have more strength than others in
projecting what ought to be the accepted version of Central America, many of them conflicting,
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especially when bearing in mind Panamá and Belize’s own self-exclusion from the imagined
community. Still, it is important to note that these imaginings are created from very specific
circumstances and have remained the norm because they have gone unchallenged. Were there
to be a push toward proper inclusion, in a way that is attractive for Belizeans and Panamanians
as well as those in the Core Five, it may lead to the beginning of a reimagining. What is
essential is that there be that push toward reimagining, rather than continuing to accept
the established norm. Chaverri (1985) frames the situation by presenting us with an option:
“Habría que preguntarse si el legado del pasado es todavía tan grande como para excluir Panamá y
Belice de Centroamérica, o si el peso de un accidente natural es razón suficiente para incluirlos [We
should ask ourselves if the legacy of the past is still so important as to exclude Panamá and
Belize from Central America, or if the weight of a natural accident is enough reason to include
them]” (Chaverri, p. 60).

Struggle for a Unified Region: Possible Futures for “Central
America”
It is imperative to remember that, while there have been and continue to be efforts
toward the creation of a “unified” Central America, more often than not, these attempts do not
include Belize nor Panamá. This is why the need to reimagine “Central America” remains so
crucial. Should the rest of the region successfully unite and continue on a path toward peace
and development, where does that leave the excluded? While it could be argued that they
have aid from their respective paternalistic colonizer states, and therefore have no real need
for economic nor political support from their regional neighbors, it must again be reiterated
that econopolitical factors are not—or should not—be the sole defining motivators for forming
international relationships.
Within regional contexts, building positive relationships with your neighbors is
critical and such relationships ought to be pursued for the mere sake of being surrounded
by supporters, or even friends. As observed by Benedicte Bull, the contemporary push
for regional integration already shifted its focus away from a genuine desire to create a
community, and toward being economically useful for external markets – “[A]fter being
reduced to a stepping stone in the process of integration into the global economy, the relevance
of the integration process became dependent on the need to ensure the member states’
commitment to the ‘open’ economic policies” (Bull, 1999, p. 967). With this being the driving
force, the community will be built by evaluating economic usefulness, a characteristic that may
be particularly troublesome for Belize, who has never been a notable economic powerhouse.
Interestingly, the European Union has supported the region’s struggle toward unification,
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consistently holding talks with SICA (Central American Integration System) member states
to discuss how the EU can support the SICA process and negotiations of Central American
exports receiving preferential treatment (Bull, 1999, p. 963). Although it is evident the EU
is likely offering its support with the end goal of economic gains for their own regional
organization rather than for the best interests of the Central American states themselves, it
is still worth noting how a unified Central America could have a significant—perhaps even
influential—international impact. Strengthening their economic viability within the global
market may have the positive consequence of supporting domestic development, as well as
possibly demonstrating the benefits of maintaining good relations across the region, leading to
deeper mutual appreciation, understanding, and inclusion.
Perez-Brignoli, too, suggests that a reimagining of the community is a necessary
precursor to the region’s overall recovery: “To overcome this [current political and economic]
crisis implies that development options be reoriented, [such as] a radical redefinition of
regional integration including other countries within the Caribbean basin” (p. 154). The
Caribbean basin, among many other countries, includes both Belize and Panamá. Recalling
Perez-Brignoli’s original definition of Central American, which deliberately excluded Belize
and Panamá, it is significant to note his observation that the region’s continued existence may
indeed lie in their future inclusion.
A repeated attempt at creating the Federal Republic of Central American states is not
what is needed, as it is evident that an official organized body such as the Federation, which
requires a single leader from one of the seven states to precede over the other states, is not
a viable model. Indeed, while the European Union and other unions like it could serve as
an adequate model to follow for the creation of a modern unified region, it too is likely not
sufficient. Rather, Central America needs to recognize and value the individuality of each
of its states, holding them all in equal regard without the added stress of meeting political
and economic needs: “[P]eace is lasting only if it is based on strategies of social coexistence
that are more equitable for everyone” (Perez-Brignoli, 1989, p. 178). So long as there is a
possibility for one of the republics to rule over the other six, there will likely continue to be an
unbeatable volatility throughout the entire isthmus. Perhaps there is the need for a mutualistic
and supportive solidarity in place of a new Federal Republic. There is no simple solution
to this deeply rooted issue. It is easy to continue viewing Central America as “una cadena de
repúblicas independientes [a chain of independent republics]” and nothing more, united only by
geographic circumstance (Chaverri, p. 64). Perhaps there is a fundamental incompatibility, the
margins of difference between Belize and Panamá and the Core Five far too significant, similar
to the gaps between Turkey and the EU. Regardless, there assuredly lies an abundance of
possibility within the future of Central America. While it is easy to frame the dozens of failed
unification attempts as indicative that achieving a regional community is a “utopian” dream
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(Perez-Brignoli, p. 124), it might be better to consider the continued efforts as evidence that
there is a real desire to come together.

Conclusion: Re-imagining the Imagined
Beneath the façade of a close-knit community of five countries reveals a history of
constant conflict and ever-changing alliances. Although it remains obvious that much of the
exclusion is borne from historical roots and contemporary choice based on those roots, perhaps
the biggest reason behind the exclusion is simply an inability to unite at all.
The next step in this exploration into the Central American imagined community
would be to pose the question to Central Americans themselves, especially Belizeans and
Panamanians: Who, to you, is Central America? Do you feel included, and if not, why? Selfidentification is even more important to constructing an imagined community than the
collective abstractions of others. Perhaps it ought to be considered that most Belizeans and
Panamanians are satisfied with the current status quo, having found community in other
regions. Community, after all, is built from a sense of belonging together (Chavez, 1994),
and if that is not found between the Core Five and their excluded kin, then there is no hope
for connection. I, myself, am half-Belizean, and have felt firsthand the dissonance between
Belizeans and the rest of the Central American community; it was my personal experience
in finding comradery with Panamanians on the fringes that inspired this investigation into
the question of why? But I have also experienced the community beginning to reach out to
Belizeans, including us in discourse about issues that impact Central Americans and weaving
us into the regional narrative, solidifying our sense of belonging and strengthening the
overall community. Witnessing these narrative shifts occur on a micro level bolsters my belief
that communal unity is achievable on the macro level and has the potential to impact us all
positively.
The topic of regionalism is arguably extremely Eurocentric, likely due to the European
Union (the EU) being the most well-known and oft-researched example of a functioning
multinational, regional body (Söderbaum, 2014, p. 14). The majority of sources I found
throughout my research for this paper primarily talked about the European Union with few
references to other world regions. Comparatively, finding sources about Central America
often proves to be an arduous task, let alone papers covering topics relevant to this research
question. The need to investigate and understand Central America and other regions in the
world, and to platform researchers from those regions, is essential for the continued growth of
academia: the academic community, too, can benefit from re-imagining itself.
In February of 1885, Guatemalan Liberal leader Justo Rufino Barrios declared, “Divided
and isolated we are nothing, united we can become something and united we shall be.”
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Although he spoke this in the context of unifying the region into a single Federal Republic, the
sentiment still maintains the passion that lay beneath a desire for a connected Central America.
The point is to have that desire expanded to fit Belize and Panamá within what it means to be
“Central American.” The European Union, problematic as their history may be, would never
have come together to form the relatively reliable regional body it is without first having the
notion to imagine themselves as a linked community. Regions are fluid entities that change
definitions depending on context and circumstance. The quest for an inclusive Central America
has hundreds of years of precedent, and is not one that should be, or will be, so easily thrown
away. A framework that cultivates cultural and historical connection, rather than centering
on political and economic value, is essential for pursuing this idealized imagined community.
Perhaps through this redefined community, Central America could grow from republics
united by geographic circumstance and into a holistic region of interdependent, cooperative
neighbors.

References
Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. New
York, NY: Verso.
Bolland, O. N. (1988). Colonialism and resistance in Belize: Essays in historical sociology. Benque
Viejo del Carmen, Belize: Cubola Productions.
Bonner, D. (1999). Beauty, propriety and status in a former British colony: European aesthetic
theory and social distinctions based upon racial “appearances” in Dangriga, Belize. Social
analysis: The international journal of social and cultural practice, 43(1), 119-140. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/23166562
Bull, B. (1999). ‘New regionalism’ in Central America. Third world quarterly, 20(5),
957-970. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/3993606
Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). The world factbook: Ethnic groups. Retrieved
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world factbook/fields/ 400.
html#PM
Chaverri, C. (1985). Hacia una definición de Centro América: El Peso de los factores
geopolíticos [Toward a definition of Central America: The weight of geopolitical factors].
Anuario de estudios Centroamericanos, 11(1), 59-78. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.
seattleu.edu/stable/40682730

92

Chavez, L. (1994). The power of the imagined community: the settlement of undocumented
Mexicans and Central Americans in the United States. American anthropologist, 96(1), new
series, 52-73. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy. seattleu.edu/stable/682646
Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A Black
feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics.
University of Chicago legal forum, 1, 139-167. Retrieved from https://chicagounbound.uchicago.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=uclf
Euraque, D., & García, Y. (2013). África y la diáspora Africana en los 9rogramas curriculares en
Centroamérica [Africa and the African diaspore in curriculums in Central America]. Anuario
de estudios Centroamericanos, 39, 29-53. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/
stable/43871229
Fawcett, L. (2004). Exploring regional domains: A comparative history of regionalism.
International affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), 80(3), 429-446. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/3569018
Gunew, S. (1997). Postcolonialism and multiculturalism: Between race and ethnicity. The
yearbook of English studies, 27, 22-39. doi:10.2307/3509130
Hamadi, L. (2014). Edward Said: The postcolonial theory and the literature of decolonization.
Retrieved from https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/ 3689/3488.
International Monetary Fund. (2018-a). Report for selected countries and subjects: Panamá.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/ weorept.aspx?pr.
x=36&pr.y=6&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=283&s=
NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=
International Monetary Fund. (2018-b). Report for selected countries and subjects: Costa Rica.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/ weorept.aspx?pr.
x=30&pr.y=15&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=238&s=
NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=
International Monetary Fund. (2018-c). Report for selected countries and subjects: Belize.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/ weorept.aspx?pr.
x=17&pr.y=12&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=339&s=
NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=

93

International Monetary Fund. (2018-d). Report for selected countries and subjects: Guatemala.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/ weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.
x=11&pry=3&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=258&s=
NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPCPIPCH&grp=0&a=
Perez-Brignoli, H. (1989). A brief history of Central America. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. Retrieved from https://monoskop.org/images/4/4e/ Said_Edward_
Orientalism_1979.pdf
Slade, W. (1917). The Federation of Central America. The journal of race
development, 8(2), 204-276. doi:10.2307/29738239
Söderbaum, F. (2013). Rethinking regions and regionalism. Georgetown journal of
international affairs 14(2), 9-18. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.seattleu.edu/
stable/43134407
Tharps, Lori L. (2014). The case for black with a capital B. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-black-with-a-capitalb.html
Theodossopoulos, D. (2010). With or without gringos: When Panamanians talk about the
United States and its citizens. The international journal of social and cultural practice, 54 (1): 52-70.
Young, A. and Young, D. (1988). The impact of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute on the
internal politics of Belize. Latin American perspectives, 15 (2): 6-30.

94

Notes
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region that constitutes over fifty countries.
These countries are united by shared characteristics like language (Arabic, Hebrew, Persian,
Turkish), religion (Islam), economy (oil and gas industries), and historical backgrounds. Unlike
the EU, it is not an official regional body, but rather a regional community tied together by
these common traits.
1

When referencing the Maya people, I use “Maya” in place of “Mayan” because, in my
experience, both in-country in Belize and in US diaspora spaces, it is how Maya people refer to
themselves. “Mayan” is typically only used in reference to the language family.
2

Belize’s territory was also included in the original Kingdom of Guatemala, but given that
the Spanish paid little attention to this part of the territory, resulting in the British contesting
Spanish rule over the land and claiming it for their own soon after, it has no real pertinence to
the argument at hand.
3

The “Global North” is an alternative term for “the West” (or “First World” countries),
popularized in recent decades by people in the Global South (“Third World” countries) who
called for terms that were more equalizing and did not put the Global South at the bottom of
the global political and economic hierarchy. The Global North includes colonizing European
countries (England, Spain) and the United States, among other G8 countries that are not
relevant to the context of this paper.
4

The Panamá Canal was built between 1881 – 1914, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
with a waterway straight across the Panamanian territory. The Canal is the center of Panamá’s
economy, providing the country with jobs both directly related to the Canal (such as its
maintenance, mitigating its effects on the environment, etc.) and tangentially related (such as
hotels for people visiting for Canal-related business).
5

The Commonwealth of Nations was officially established in 1926 and consists of 53
states, almost all of them colonized by the British Empire during the height of 19th century
colonization.
6

7

A department (un departamento) is equivalent to a province or a state.
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I opt to write capital-B “Black” rather than lowercase-b “black” because, to quote author Lori
L. Tharps, “Black with a capital B refers to people of the African diaspora. Lowercase black is
simply a color.” It is a recognition of a collective population whose experiences, as diverse as
they are and as distanced from one another as they may be, can be appreciated with as much
weight as any nationality.
8

Prejudice based on lightness or darkness of skin; colorism has clear roots in racism, but the
difference is that people of the same race could potentially receive different treatment due to
their skin tone’s shade.
9

Belize: 25.9% Creole, 6.1% Garifuna; Panamá: 9.2% Black (self-identified), 6.8% mulatto. Both
from 2010 census estimates.
10

11

2015 Nicaraguan census estimate.

12

2001 Guatemalan census estimate; 2007 Salvadoran census estimate

I separate “light-skinned” from “white people” and “dark-skinned” from “Black people”
in order to acknowledge that not all light-skinned people are racially white, nor are all darkskinned people racially Black. I do this also to maintain space for addressing the impact of
colorism: light-skinned Black people and other light-skinned people of color tend to receive
better social treatment (more access to social opportunities such as jobs and housing, as well as
less public harassment or racial profiling) than their darker-skinned counterparts, even if they
are of the same race or ethnicity.
13

14

Calculated off the World Bank’s population total of 4,176,873 as of 2018.

15

2018 population total: 4,999,441.

2019 population total: 408,487. Given that Belize’s population is so small compared to
Panamá and Costa Rica’s, it may be helpful to see the fourth highest GDP: with a population of
17,263,239, Guatemala’s 2018 GDP was $4,582 (2018d).
16

“Hispanophobia” draws on the word “Hispanic,” which simply denotes someone who can
speak Spanish and does not refer to a particular race, ethnicity, or nationality. Someone who
is Spanish is a person who is from, or whose family is from, Spain—it is a nationality, not or
a race or ethnicity. Both Spanish and Hispanic is different from being Latine/Latinx (Latine/
17
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Latinx is the gender-neutral form of Latino/a). Someone who is Latine is from a country in
Central or South America (with some debate over whether this includes Belize and other nonSpanish/Portuguese-speaking countries). A person can be Latine without being Hispanic—
perhaps they are Salvadoran but do not speak Spanish. Hispanic, Spanish, and Latine/Latinx
are terms that are easily confused and understanding their usage is critical.
Presumed to mean a fear of Spanish-speakers, both Belizean and non-Belizean, “stealing
jobs” from English-speaking Belizeans.
18

The specific crisis Perez-Brignoli is referring to here is the Central American Common
Market buckling under the pressure of the worldwide recession during the 1980s, and the
impact this had on the Core Five’s economic and political stability.
19

Some scholars argue that a reason why Turkey has been barred from the EU after decades of
application and active campaign for membership is because of cultural and religious identities
that are inherently conflicting with those of the EU members.
20
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